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ABSTRACT 
 
An increasing number of case studies provide evidence that the interaction between global actors and firms in 
developing countries, particularly within the context of global supply chains, translate into critical knowledge 
acquisition. Examining vertically-integrated affiliates located in Chile we provide systematic evidence showing 
that foreign affiliates inserted in global supply chains tend to have larger capabilities in terms of size, skills and 
productivity, are more export oriented, and produce goods of higher quality, as measured by unit values, than 
other exporters in the country. We show that the superiority of these establishments increase with the age of 
the multinational indicating that time is required to accumulate the necessary skills. We also show that the 
edge of foreign affiliates in terms of the export outcomes decreases but does not disappear completely after 
these differences in plant capabilities are controlled for, a result that suggests that additional factors, most 
likely of intangible nature, might be behind the improved export performance and higher quality of goods of 
these establishments. 
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1 Introduction 
Production processes have been increasingly fragmented worldwide. That is, the making of many goods has 
become a multi-country process in which different stages are carried out in specialized plants in different 
parts of the world. Many developing countries are seeking to join international production networks for 
various reasons. For instance, participation in international supply chains is frequently associated with rapid 
learning, technology transfers and knowledge spillovers. A literature on global value chains has emphasized 
the idea that suppliers in production networks are exposed to learning and knowledge acquisition emanating 
from lead firms (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; Schmitz and Knorringa, 2000, Schmitz, 2006). Lead firms are 
generally willing to transfer knowledge to their suppliers because failing to do so might entail risks for 
themselves. For instance, the arrival of a component with the incorrect specifications can have quite 
disrupted impacts in the production of a final good as entire production lines might be shut down until all the 
correct inputs have been gathered. Accordingly, lead firms expose their suppliers to quality control systems 
and prevailing global business standards that tend to exceed those in developing countries. By being “pushed” 
to possess or acquire higher competencies these suppliers tend to produce goods of higher quality than other 
firms in their countries.  
There have been an increasing number of case studies showing that access to a global production network is 
indeed associated with critical acquisition of capabilities and high quality goods. Analyses can be found in 
many sectors, like in apparel (Gereffi, 1999), motorcycle (Fujita, 2011), the agroindustry (Cafaggi, et al., 2012) 
or the computer industry (Kawakami, 2011). But more systematic evidence showing that participation in 
production networks is associated with superior competencies and higher quality goods is still missing. This 
paper seeks to fill this gap in the literature. 
In this study we combine a detailed dataset of multinational companies with plant level data from Chile to 
compare the performance of vertically-integrated affiliates with that of local plants. If suppliers in global 
production networks are required to possess superior capabilities in order to successfully perform in value 
chains, this should be particularly true when the supplier is an affiliate of a multinational company. 
Accordingly, we examine whether vertically-integrated affiliates located in Chile exhibit an edge over other 
exporters in the country in a number of export outcomes and firm characteristics.  
It is worth noting that vertical FDI is not the only strategy that production processes can be offshored. Lead 
firms fragmenting production internationally can open affiliates in other countries but they can also engage in 
foreign outsourcing with independent suppliers if they decide to keep offshoring outside the boundaries of 
the firm. Admittedly, this could represent a problem for our exercise because our control group could in 
principle include local independent suppliers that participate in international production networks and as 
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mentioned above, these suppliers could be exposed to higher quality controls and business standards in 
similar ways as the affiliates of multinationals. Ideally we would like to separate this type of establishments 
from the control group; unfortunately we do not have the required information to do so. Keeping these 
plants in the sample could bias the results, but if anything, the direction of the bias should be against the 
likelihood of finding a superior performance of the vertically-integrated affiliates over the control group. 
The results show that even within narrowly defined sectors, vertically-integrated affiliates tend to be bigger, 
exhibit larger shares of skilled workers and have larger productivity levels than the rest of the exporters. The 
results also show that these firms are superior in terms of total exports as well as the number of products 
exported and have larger export unit values than the other exporters. The findings go in line with increasing 
evidence from case studies in the global value chain literature that participation in production networks is 
associated with improved capabilities and higher quality of the goods. 
The paper is also related to a more general FDI literature showing that foreign affiliates have better 
performance than local counterparts. For instance, Barefoot and Mataloni (2011) present evidence for the US 
suggesting that labor productivity in the manufacturing sector is higher among multinational parents than 
among non-multinationals. Similarly, Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) provide evidence for Belgium, France, 
Germany and Norway indicating that multinational parents are generally bigger, more productive and pay 
higher wages than firms that are not engaged in multinational activity. More related to our paper, there is an 
important literature showing that foreign affiliates tend to perform better than the local plants in their host 
countries. For instance, higher productivity levels in foreign affiliates relative to domestic plants has been 
found for various countries including Venezuela (Aitken and Harrison, 1999), Lithuania (Javorcik, 2004), the 
Czech Republic (Sabirianova et al., 2005) and Turkey (Yasar and Paul, 2007). Antras and Yeaple (2013) show 
evidence for a group of OECD countries that affiliates of multinationals tend to be larger, more productive, 
more R&D intensive and more export oriented than local firms. Arnold and Javorcik (2009) found that the 
acquisition of local plants by multinationals in Indonesia led to significant productivity improvements in the 
acquired plants. 
Our paper is specially related to a stream of the FDI literature that has found empirical support to the notion 
that FDI may promote upgrading and higher quality of export products. For example, using firm level data 
for Mexico, Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) show that unit values of new export products introduced by 
foreign firms are larger than those of domestic producers. Similarly, Wang and Wei (2008) show that 
multinationals in China have systematically higher unit values than local firms, suggesting they produce 
higher-end products. Finally, using a cross-country analysis, Harding and Javorcik (2012) show that more FDI 
presence is positively correlated with higher unit values of exports. 
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Our results complement this literature in various ways. First, as we focus on vertically-linked affiliates, we are 
the first study to explicitly examine the functioning of multinationals relative to local firms in the context of 
global supply chains. Second, we provide additional insights regarding the improved performance of these 
multinationals. For instance, we investigate whether there are dynamics in the enhanced performance of 
affiliates over the local plants. Our results indicate that in general the gaps increases with the age of the 
multinational, suggesting that certain skills and capabilities tend to be accumulated only over the years. 
Second, we also show that the superiority of foreign affiliates in terms of export outcomes decreases but does 
not disappear completely after differences in plant capabilities, like size, productivity and skills, are controlled 
for. This last result indicate that well defined plant capacities play an important role behind the improved 
outcomes of the foreign affiliates but that there might also be other contributing factors, most likely of 
intangible nature. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In sector 2 we describe the datasets, basic patterns in the data 
and the empirical estimation that we conduct. Section 3 shows the results of the estimation and discusses the 
most salient findings. Finally, section 4 concludes.  
2 Data description and basic patterns 
We merge three datasets in our analysis. First we employ a worldwide dataset of multinationals, the 
Worldbase dataset from Dun & Bradstreet (D&B).1 For each establishment in this dataset, there is 
information on an array of variables, including: country and city of location, industry codes and ownership 
(the firm’s parents). From this dataset we choose the affiliates located in Chile that exhibit corporate linkages2 
with multinationals in other countries. In addition, we follow Alfaro and Charlton (2009) in identifying 
whether the relationship between the affiliate and its parent company is horizontal (the parent and the 
subsidiary produce the same good), vertical (the subsidiary produces an input to the parent) or complex (the 
relationship is both horizontal and vertical). The methodology essentially entails comparing the industry 
codes (at the 4-digit SIC level) of both parents and subsidiaries to examine whether they produce the same 
good and/or whether the subsidiary is a supplier to its parent. The latter is determined using the industry 
                                                          
1 The data have also been used in academic studies for various purposes including the comparison of size and diversification patterns 
of foreign investment in North America (Caves, 1975), the development of microdatasets on enterprises (Lipsey, 1978), the effect of 
bank credit availability and business creation (Black and Strahan, 2002), the relationship between financial development and vertical 
integration (Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton, 2009), the patterns of intra-industry and inter-industry FDI (Alfaro and Charlton, 2009) 
and the relationship between foreign ownership and establishment performance (Alfaro and Chen, 2011). 
2 A corporate linkage occurs when one business location has financial and legal responsibility for another business location. In the 
D&B dataset a corporate linkage occurs between a subsidiary and its parent or between a branch and its headquarter. A subsidiary is a 
corporation that is more than 50% owned by another corporation. A parent is a corporation that owns more than 50% of another 
corporation. A headquarter is a business establishment that has branches reporting to it, and is financially responsible for those 
branches. A branch is a secondary location of its headquarters and it has no legal responsibility for its debts. There are other types of 
family relationships that may occur between companies which are not linked in the D&B dataset because the relationship does not 
involve legal or financial responsibility. For instance, one company owns a part or minority interest, less than 50%, in another 
company or joint ventures where there is a 50/50 split in the ownership. 
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codes in combination with an input-output table to identify whether the industry of the subsidiary 
corresponds to an upstream industry of the parent’s output. Similarly to Alfaro and Charlton (2009) we use 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis 1987 benchmark input-output table and employ alternative thresholds of 
the input-output total requirements coefficient.3 In this paper we work only with the affiliates that are 
vertically-linked to a firm in another country which are identified at the 4-digit SIC level. 
The second dataset consists on transaction-level data from the Chilean national customs authority –Servicio 
National de Aduana- for all the manufacturing firms. Trade transactions in this dataset are identified at the 8-
digit HS level and each record includes a firm identifier, the destination country, the export value of the 
transaction as well as its unit value in US dollars. These data provides the basis for comparing unit values and 
other export performance indicators across establishments. Finally, we employ plant-level data from the 
annual manufacturing survey ENIA (Encuesta Nacional Industrial Annual) conducted by the national institute of 
statistics, INE. The survey covers all manufacturing establishments in the country with more than 10 
employees and provides information on plant characteristics, such as manufacturing industry (4-digit ISIC 
rev3), production, employment, and investment. Capital stocks are constructed using the perpetual inventory 
method for each plant (see Liu, 1993) and a measure of the plant’s total factor productivity is constructed 
using multifactor superlative index number as in Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006). Using this manufacturing 
survey allows us to compare vertically-linked affiliates with the other plants in terms of various firm 
characteristics. 
The combination of these three datasets gives us a rich amount of information to perform the various 
comparisons of this study. The ENIA survey encompasses an average of 5,400 plants per year and from this 
group around 1,400 plants are exporters. We can analyze in detail the export transactions of these 1,400 
plants after merging the ENIA survey with the customs data. Using the Worldbase dataset we identify from 
this group of exporters 73 plants that are vertically-linked to multinationals in other countries. We compare 
these 73 plants against the other exporters in terms of a number of characteristics and export outcomes. Our 
data is available for the 1997-2006 period. 
Table 1 provides a preliminary comparison between the vertically-linked affiliates and the rests of the 
exporters across various export outcomes. On average, vertically-linked affiliates sell abroad 12.1 products for 
60.4 million US dollars while the corresponding figures for the other exporters is 7.8 products for 16.4 
million US dollars. When we look at the unit values of exports, the comparison provides mixed results. In 
terms of average, affiliates exhibit lower unit values than the rest of the exporters while the opposite is true 
when median values are used. 
                                                          
3 Specifically, we employ a baseline threshold equal to 0.001. See Blyde and Molina (2013) for a discussion on the use of thresholds. 
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While informative, the results in table 1 are only rough approximations of the true differences between these 
two groups of plants. The values in table 1 are averages across different products and across establishments in 
different sectors. A proper exercise must compare total export values and total number of products across 
firms in similar sectors, and unit values across similar types of goods. To this end we run the following 
specifications: 
                            (1)   
where      is either the log of the total value of exports or the log of the total number of products that plant i 
in sector k exports in year t,    is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the plant is a vertically-linked 
affiliate and zero otherwise, and     and    are sector and year fixed effects, respectively. The sector in this 
specification is defined at the 4-digit ISIC rev 3 level. If foreign affiliates exhibit enhanced outcomes over the 
rest of the exporters, we should expect a positive and significant coefficient for  . 
Additionally, we run the following specification for the unit values: 
                                 (2)   
where        is the log of the unit value of the export of good p by plant i to destination country c  in year t, 
  ,    and     are product, destination country and year fixed effects, respectively, and    is defined as 
before. The product in this specification is at the 8-digit HS level. The specification takes in consideration 
that unit values might differ across firms, products, years and destination country. By using the dataset at this 
level of disaggregation we avoid having to work with average unit values across any of these dimensions.  
3 Econometric results 
Table 2 shows the results after estimating equation (1) for the total value of exports and the total number of 
products. The results in columns (1) and (3) reveal the stronger export performance of the vertically-linked 
affiliates over the rest of the exporters. Foreign affiliates export around 4 times more (e1.6 – 1 = 3.9) and sell 
abroad about 54% (e0.43 – 1 =0.54) more products than the other exporters. The results in columns (2) and (4) 
in which we control for possible changes in sector characteristics across time using sector-year fixed effects, 
confirm these findings. 
The comparison for unit values is shown in table 3. Column (1) of this table presents the baseline 
specification introduced in equation (2). Columns (2)-(4) run alternative combinations of fixed effects to 
examine whether the results change in any significant way. The coefficient estimate for the dummy on vertical 
affiliate is positive and significant at 1% level in all the regressions and the coefficients seem to be very stable 
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across the various specifications. Exports of vertical affiliates exhibit unit values that are on average 8% 
higher than the unit values of the rest of the exporters, suggesting that foreign affiliates tent to export higher 
quality goods.  
One issue of potential concern is the possibility that multinationals are engaging in transfer pricing, the 
practice of adjusting charges among related parties to take advantages of differences in tax systems and/or 
import duties across locations. Evidence supporting the existence of transfer pricing is shown in Swenson 
(2001), Clausing (2003) and Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006). It is possible then the unit values of the 
exports that are sent from the affiliate to its parent company or to other plants that belong the multinational’s 
family are affected by transfer pricing practices. Unfortunately we do not have a direct way to control for this 
factor. What we do in this paper, however, is to test whether the edge that we observe in unit values from the 
affiliates is still present when we examine only the exports that they sell in countries outside the 
multinational’s network. We argue that if the edge is still present, it is not very likely that transfer pricing 
activities are the driving factor behind the higher unit values that we observe in the initial results.  
We employ the Worldbase dataset to identify for each vertically-linked foreign affiliate in Chile the country of 
its parent as well as the countries in which its parent has other affiliates. Then, we re-calculate the unit values 
of the foreign affiliate by using only the exports that do not go to any of these countries. The control group 
remains the same as before. Columns (5)-(8) show the results. While the coefficient estimates vary slightly 
from the previous regressions they remain positive and significant at conventional levels suggesting that the 
higher unit values of the exports of foreign affiliates are not likely to be driven by transfer pricing activities.  
Beyond export outcomes, we also want to analyze whether vertically-linked affiliates show superior 
performance in terms of certain firm characteristics. Table 4 shows this exercise. The first panel compares the 
foreign affiliates with all the establishments of the ENIA which includes the exporters and the non-exporters 
of the survey. The results show that the foreign affiliates tend to be bigger, exhibit larger shares of skilled 
workers and possess higher levels of total factor productivity than the rest of the plants. The middle panel 
shows that the favorable comparison remains when the control group consists only on the exporters of the 
sample, while the bottom panel shows that the superiority is particularly large with respects to the non-
exporters. In short, exporters exhibit larger capabilities than non-exporters and foreign affiliates exhibit larger 
capabilities than the exporters.  
Now we would like to examine whether there are some dynamics in the superiority of the foreign affiliates. In 
section 1 we argue that the suppliers in global supply chains are typically pushed to acquire enhanced 
capabilities in order to successfully perform in international production networks. While the results in table 4 
certainly provide evidence that vertically-linked foreign affiliates exhibit higher capabilities relative to other 
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plants, it is unclear whether this edge is present from the start or whether it is accumulated over time. To 
explore this issue we augment equation (1) in the following way: 
           
      
      
                 (3)   
where    
  is equal to 1 if the plant is a vertically-linked affiliate and is less than 5 years old;    
  is equal to 1 if 
the plant is a vertically-linked affiliate and is between 5 and 15 years old, and    
  is equal to 1 if the plant is a 
vertically-linked affiliate and is older than 15 years. With this specification we employ age cohorts in order to 
separate the life cycle of the affiliates in reasonable groups: young (up to 5 years), mid-age (between 6 and 15) 
and mature (more than 15), and then check whether the superiority of the affiliate changes across these 
cohorts.4 The results for size, share of skilled labor and productivity are shown in figure 1 which plots the 
estimates of     ,    and     for each of the regressions.5  
The first aspect to notice in the three graphs is that the estimated coefficient is already positive and significant 
in the first cohort. In principle, this would suggest that foreign affiliates exhibit better capabilities from the 
start. However, a word of caution is in order here. While we can establish the age of the affiliate because we 
know the year it was founded, it is certainly possible that the plant would have started operations before that 
year, for instance, as an independent firm. Since we do not have a way to know whether this is the case or 
not, we will not want to jump into any conclusion with respect to this particular result. Rather than focusing 
on the point estimate of the first cohort, we will focus on the entire trend. 
In general, the trends suggest that the superior capabilities of the foreign affiliates increase with time. The 
graphs show that the gaps in terms of size, skills and productivity that the mature affiliates exhibit relative to 
the control group are larger than the gaps that the young affiliates exhibit relative to the same group. 
Figure 2 show the results for the various export outcomes. The three graphs in the first column depict the 
results when we employ all the exports of the foreign affiliate while the three graphs of the second column 
present the results when only the exports of the affiliate to the countries outside its network are considered. 
In general, the trends indicate that the better performance of the foreign affiliates in terms of total exports 
and the number of products increase with time. Interestingly, this does not seem to be the case for unit values 
which remain roughly the same between the first two cohorts and then decline in the third cohort. The 
comparison between the dynamics observed between the unit values in figure 2 and the variables in figure 1 
indicate that the edge of affiliates in terms of firm’s capabilities increases over time while the edge in terms of 
                                                          
4 We also employ slightly different cohorts and the results do not change in any significant way 
5 If a coefficient is not statistically significant at 10% level it is plotted with a zero value regardless of its estimated value in the 
regression 
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the quality of the goods does not. This could suggest that the firm capabilities that we are examining (size, 
skills and productivity) might not be the only factors behind the better export performance that foreign 
affiliates exhibit, particularly for unit values. We take a closer look at this issue next. 
First, we run the same regressions as in table 2 but controlling for differences in size, skills and productivity. 
The idea is to see whether differences in these capabilities are behind the better performance of the affiliates 
in the various export outcomes and whether controlling them eliminates the gaps originally found in the 
export outcomes. The results are reported in table 5 which again depicts regressions when all the exports of 
the affiliates are employed (columns 1 to 4) and when only the exports to the countries outside the affiliate’s 
network are considered. A direct comparison of the coefficients for the dummy variable in columns (1) to (4) 
with the ones in table 2 shows that all the estimates decrease considerably, around half of the original 
estimates. This already indicates that the capabilities included in the regression play a role in the enhanced 
export outcomes of the affiliates. Interestingly, however, all the estimates are still positive and significant, 
suggesting that there might be still other factors besides those controlled by these firm characteristics that 
could be behind the edge of the foreign affiliates. Note also that the coefficients for the dummy variable in 
the regressions for the number of products when the affiliate export to the countries outside its network 
(columns 7 and 8) are not statistically significant. The result suggests that for this particular export outcome, 
the differences in the capabilities examined in these regressions account entirely for superiority of the foreign 
affiliate. 
Table 6 presents a similar exercise for the unit values. The results from this table can be compared to those in 
table 3. Once again the estimates decline in all the regressions but they are still positive and significant at 
conventional levels, suggesting that there might be still other factors behind the higher quality of goods 
produced by foreign affiliates. 
Finally, we re-estimate an augmented version of equation (3) in which the labor, skills and productivity 
variables are also included in the regression. Figure 3 shows the point estimates of    ,    and     for the 
various export outcomes. For comparison, we also include the original point estimates that we presented in 
figure 2. Because the new point estimates are always smaller than the original ones, it is clear again that these 
firm characteristics play an important role in the superiority of the foreign affiliates over the control group, 
particularly for exports and number of products and less so for unit values. It is also clear that these 
capabilities do not account completely for the gaps observed because most of the point estimates continue to 
be statistically significant. The fact that concrete measures of plant’s characteristics like size, skills or 
productivity do not exhaust the possible explanations behind the better export outcomes of the foreign 
affiliates suggests that other aspects, perhaps more intangible in nature, could be playing additional roles. For 
instance, information barriers can be an important obstacle behind export activities (Rauch, 1996, 1999). 
10 
 
These barriers might be less severe for a multinational group with a large capacity to gather tacit knowledge 
and exchange it through its various production units than for a single plant. Exploring in detail the role of this 
or other potential factors would be an interesting project for further research. 
4 Conclusions 
A recent literature on global value chains have emphasized the idea that the interaction between global actors 
and firms in developing countries, particularly within the context of global supply chains, is likely to translate 
into critical knowledge acquisition. An increasing number of case studies support the notion that lead firms 
tend to expose their suppliers to high quality control systems and technical standards and as a result they 
produce goods of higher quality than other firms in the country. But more systematic evidence was still 
lacking. 
In this study we compare vertically-integrated affiliates located in Chile with other exporters in the country to 
examine whether participation in production networks is correlated with better performance outcomes. We 
show that vertically-integrated affiliates are bigger, exhibit larger shares of skilled workers, have higher 
productivity levels, export more and produce goods of higher quality, as measured by unit values, than the 
rest of the plants. Our results also indicate that the improved capabilities of foreign affiliates do not arise 
overnight. In general, the gaps between the foreign affiliate and the local plants increase with the age of the 
multinational, suggesting that superior skills and capabilities require time to accumulate. 
We also show that the superiority of foreign affiliates in terms of export outcomes decreases but does not 
disappear completely after differences in plant capabilities, like size, productivity and skills, are controlled for, 
a result that suggests that additional factors, most likely of intangible nature like lower information barriers, 
might behind the enhanced export performance and higher quality of goods of foreign affiliates. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics. Average values for the period 1997-2006 
  Vertically-linked affiliates   Other exporters 
Variable \ Statistics Mean   Median   Mean   Median 
Exports  60,411.64 
 
2,301.79 
 
16,410.42 
 
398.00 
        
Number of products 12.11 
 
6.35 
 
7.78 
 
4.21 
        
Unit value 2,860.41 
 
37.67 
 
6,913.79 
 
12.01 
        
Notes: the sample includes 1452 firms of which 73 are vertically-linked affiliates and 1379 are other exporters. Exports and unit vales are 
expressed in thousands of US dollars and US dollars respectivelly 
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Table 2: Regressions on total exports and number of products 
 
Exports 
 
Number of products 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
      
Dummy vertical affiliate 1.6159*** 1.5998*** 
 
0.4386*** 0.4298*** 
 
(0.1197) (0.1245) 
 
(0.0498) (0.0515) 
            
Sector fixed effect yes no   yes no 
Year fixed effect yes no 
 
yes no 
Sector-year fixed effect no yes 
 
no yes 
Observations 8000 8000   8002 8002 
R2 0.30 0.34 
 
0.14 0.19 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the log of exports at the firm, sector and year level; the dependent 
variable in columns (3) and (4). Sector is defined at the 4-digit ISIC rev3 level. 
*** ; ** ; * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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Table 3: Regressions on unit values 
  To all countries To countries outside the network 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
     
  
   
Dummy vertical affiliate 0.0809*** 0.0648*** 0.0962*** 0.0884*** 0.0484*** 0.0612*** 0.0713*** 0.0996*** 
 
(0.0125) (0.0134) (0.0117) (0.0142) (0.0145) (0.0157) (0.0134) (0.0162) 
                  
Product fixed effect yes no no no yes no no no 
Country fixed effect yes no no no yes no no no 
Year fixed effect yes yes no no yes yes no no 
Product-country fixed effect no yes no no no yes no no 
Product-year fixed effect no no yes no no no yes no 
Country-year fixed effect no no yes no no no yes no 
Product-country-year fixed effect no no no yes no no no yes 
Observations 186723 186723 186723 186723 181708 181708 181708 181708 
R2 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91 091 0.92 
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the log of the average unit value at the firm, product, destination country and year level. In columns (1)-(4) the destination is any country, and in 
colums (5)-(8) the destination is any country outside the affiliate's network. 
*** ; ** ; * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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Table 4: Regressions on establishment characteristics 
Comparison with all firms 
 
Labor  
 
Share of skilled 
workers 
  Productivity 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
         
Dummy vertical affiliate 0.8437*** 0.8537*** 
 
0.1844*** 0.1823*** 
 
0.3788*** 0.3693*** 
 
(0.0322) (0.0324) 
 
(0.0089) (0.0089) 
 
(0.0315) (0.0316) 
                  
Observations 65178 65178   65178 65178   57680 57680 
R2 0.15 0.16 
 
0.11 0.13 
 
0.04 0.07 
Comparison with exporters 
 
Labor  
 
Share of skilled 
workers 
  Productivity 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
         
Dummy vertical affiliate 0.3726*** 0.3837*** 
 
0.1477*** 0.1478*** 
 
0.2687*** 0.2652*** 
 
(0.0385) (0.0397) 
 
(0.0088) (0.0089) 
 
(0.0330) (0.0335) 
                  
Observations 18134 18134   18134 18134   16343 16343 
R2 0.17 0.19 
 
0.21 0.25 
 
0.09 0.13 
Comparison with non-exporters 
 
Labor  
 
Share of skilled 
workers 
  Productivity 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
         
Dummy vertical affiliate 1.1886*** 1.2001*** 
 
0.1800*** 0.1772*** 
 
0.4355*** 0.4263*** 
 
(0.0277) (0.0279) 
 
(0.0095) (0.0095) 
 
(0.0329) (0.0331) 
                  
Observations 48201 48201   48201 48201   42343 42343 
R2 0.13 0.15 
 
0.11 0.13 
 
0.05 0.08 
Sector fixed effect yes no   yes no   yes no 
Year fixed effect yes no 
 
yes no 
 
yes no 
Sector-year fixed effect no yes 
 
no yes 
 
no yes 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the log of the the establishment's labor force; the dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is the 
share of skilled workers in total workers; the dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is a measure of total factor productivity based on the multifactor 
superlative index number. the sector is defined at the 4-digit ISIC rev3 level. 
*** ; ** ; * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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Table 5: Regressions on exports and number of products, controlling for firm characteristics 
  To all countries To countries outside the network 
 
Exports 
 
Number of products Exports 
 
Number of products 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
      
  
    
Dummy vertical affiliate 0.8751*** 0.8536*** 
 
0.1680*** 0.1561*** 0.5591*** 0.5285*** 
 
-0.0439 -0.0530 
 
(0.1042) (0.1081) 
 
(0.0448) (0.0461) (0.1065) (0.1103) 
 
(0.0457) (0.0470) 
      
  
    
Labor  1.2287*** 1.2256*** 
 
0.4485*** 0.4544*** 1.2261*** 1.2242*** 
 
0.4451*** 0.4510*** 
 
(0.0234) (0.0244) 
 
(0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0234) (0.0244) 
 
(0.0101) (0.0104) 
      
  
    
Productivity 0.3518*** 0.3657*** 
 
0.1904*** 0.2121*** 0.3501*** 0.3626*** 
 
0.1878*** 0.2078*** 
 
(0.0322) (0.0341) 
 
(0.0138) (0.0146) (0.0322) (0.0342) 
 
(0.0138) (0.0146) 
      
  
    
Share of skilled labor 1.0483*** 1.1259*** 
 
0.3078*** 0.3116*** 1.0274*** 1.1055*** 
 
0.2911*** 0.2912*** 
 
(0.1014) (0.1071) 
 
(0.0436) (0.0457) (0.1014) (0.1071) 
 
(0.0436) (0.0456) 
                      
Sector fixed effect yes no   yes no yes no   yes no 
Year fixed effect yes no 
 
yes no yes no 
 
yes no 
Sector-year fixed effect no yes 
 
no yes no yes 
 
no yes 
Observations 8000 8000   8002 8002 7975 7975   7977 7977 
R2 0.49 0.52 
 
0.32 0.37 0.48 0.52 
 
0.31 0.37 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1),(2),(5) and (6) is the log of exports at the firm, sector and year level; the dependent variable in columns (3),(4),(7) and (8) is the log of the number 
of products at the firm, sector and year level.  In columns (1)-(4) the destination is any country, and in colums (5)-(8) the destination is any country outside the affiliate's network. Sector is 
defined at the 4-digit ISIC rev3 level. 
*** ; ** ; * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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Table 6: Regressions on unit values, controlling for firm characteristics 
  To all countries To countries outside the network 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
     
  
   
Dummy vertical affiliate 0.0670*** 0.0579*** 0.0777*** 0.0785*** 0.0383*** 0.0568*** 0.0579*** 0.0932*** 
 
(0.0125) (0.0134) (0.0117) (0.0142) (0.0145) (0.0157) (0.0135) (0.0162) 
     
  
   
Labor  0.0271*** 0.0203*** 0.0438*** 0.0389*** 0.0258*** 0.0209*** 0.0435*** 0.0407*** 
 
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0031) (0.0034) (0.0030) (0.0036) 
    
    
   
Productivity 0.0274*** 0.0239*** 0.0326*** 0.0289*** 0.0268*** 0.0242*** 0.0321*** 0.0292*** 
 
(0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0039) 
    
    
   
Share of skilled labor 0.0811*** 0.0242* 0.1026*** 0.0252* 0.0880*** 0.0349*** 0.1118*** 0.0379** 
 
(0.0035) (0.0131) (0.0127) (0.0035) (0.0129) (0.0133) (0.0128) (0.0152) 
                  
Product fixed effect yes no no no yes no no no 
Country fixed effect yes no no no yes no no no 
Year fixed effect yes yes no no yes yes no no 
Product-country fixed effect no yes no no no yes no no 
Product-year fixed effect no no yes no no no yes no 
Country-year fixed effect no no yes no no no yes no 
Product-country-year fixed effect no no no yes no no no yes 
Observations 186723 186723 186723 186723 181708 181708 181708 181708 
R2 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the log of the average unit value at the firm, product, destination country and year level. In columns (1)-(4) the destination is any country, and in 
colums (5)-(8) the destination is any country outside the affiliate's network. 
*** ; ** ; * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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Figure 1: Estimated coefficients for the vertical affiliate dummies 
across cohorts, firm characteristics 
 
    Note: the graphs present the point estimates of     ,    and    in  
    equation (3) when the dependent variables are the log of labor,  
    the log of the share of skilled labor and the log of productivity 
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Figure 2: Estimated coefficients for the vertical affiliate dummies 
across cohorts, export variables 
 
           Note: the graphs present the point estimates of     ,    and    in equation (3) when the dependent variables are the log of total exports, 
          the log of the number of products exported and the log of unit values. The three graphs in the first column depict the results 
          when all the exports of the foreign affiliate are considered while the three graphs of the second column present the results  
          when only the exports of the affiliate to the countries outside its network are employed 
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Figure 3: Estimated coefficients for the vertical affiliate dummies 
 across cohorts and controlling for firm characteristics, export variables
 
               Note: the graphs present the point estimates of     ,    and    in equation (3) when the dependent variables are the log of total exports, 
             the log of the number of products exported and the log of unit values. The point estimates when no firm characteristics are  
             controlled for are  presented in dark circles while the point estimates after controlling for firm characteristics are presented in  
             light triangles. The three graphs in the first column depict the results when all the exports of the foreign affiliate are considered 
             while the three graphs of the second column present the results when only the exports of the affiliate to the countries outside its  
             network are employed 
 
 
          All countries                               Countries outside the network 
                    
                    
                     
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
youth mid-age mature
Exports
Overall
Controlling for firm characteristics
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
youth mid-age mature
Exports
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
youth mid-age mature
Number of  Products
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
youth mid-age mature
Number of  Products
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
youth mid-age mature
Unit Value
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
youth mid-age mature
Unit Value
